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I. The Pricing of Stock Index Futures Contracts
The no-arbitrage condition for pricing stock index futures takes into account the fact that the holder Donald Keim, Jeremy Siegel, and Sam Thomas provided useful comments on an earlier draft. doesn't have to put up the money that would be required if one was purchasing the stocks directly. Buying the futures, however, does not entitle the holder to receive dividends before the expiration date. Thus, the "cost of carry" model for pricing a stock index futures contract with maturity date T is
FT = ST(1 + r -div)T-t
where r is the risk-free rate of interest, div is the dividend yield on the index, and T-t is the amount of time until maturity. For example, if the index is at 240, the interest rate is 7% per year, the dividend yield is 4%, and there are three months to maturity, the futures should be priced at 241.78 = 240(1 + 0.07 -0.04)0.25
The difference between the futures price and the index price is known as the basis. For the above example, the basis on this contract would be 1.78. Because of transaction costs and other factors, the basis on a futures contract can deviate from the theoretical value, exposing a speculator to "basis risk" as well as the risk associated with movements in the underlying indices. Keim (1983) documented that the small firm effect occurred entirely in January. The pattern, based upon research using AMEX and NYSE stocks, was dubbed the turn-of-the-year effect by Richard Roll (1983). In almost every year since 1926, small stocks had higher returns than large stocks during the month of January, with the pattern most pronounced during the first week of the year.'
II. History of Stock Index
The Value Line index is a geometrically-averaged index of approximately 1,700 stocks covered by Value Line. It is an equally weighted index, and thus is relatively intensive in small stocks. The S&P 500 index, in contrast, is a value-weighted index. The equally weighted feature of the Value Line index made it an attractive vehicle for capitalizing on the turn-of-theyear effect. Both futures contracts had expiration dates every three months, in mid-March, June, September, and December. As there was no contract expiring in mid-to-late January, the March contract was the preferred contract to capitalize on the turn-of-the-year effect. Emboldened by the previous year's success, in December of 1984, I increased the size of my positions, and also organized a partnership for some friends and colleagues. We called it "The Ecstasy or Poverty Club." The first few weeks had their ups and downs. We received some margin calls. But in early January we made a lot of money. When we terminated the partnership in late January, however, an unexpected problem arose. There was no bank account for The Ecstasy or Poverty Club, and a bank teller refused my attempt to deposit the check for over $50,000 into my personal account. I was left in a quandary, until Jeremy Siegel gave me some advice: endorse it to yourself, and deposit it in an ATM.
Ill. Early Successes
The bank cashed it with no problem. I distributed the proceeds to the limited partners.
Unfortunately, the popularity of this turn-of-the-year strategy was having an effect on futures prices. Because so many people were taking long positions in the Value Line futures in December, the basis on the March Value Line futures was being forced up. As a result, the profitability of the Value Line-S&P 500 futures spread was being forced down.
In While I was teaching, the Value Line index had dropped, and lots of futures market speculators had 'Since 1983, the pattern has been much weaker, partially because the small-stock universe has been expanded to include NASDAQ-listed stocks, many of which are small glamour stocks. On the AMEX and NYSE, almost all small stocks are value stocks. In the academic literature, size is measured by market capitalization of equity, and value vs. glamour is based primarily upon book-to-market ratios of equity. Today, it is recognized that the turn-of-the-year effect is a seasonal return pattern in both size and book-to-market, with a strong interaction effect. (See Loughran, 1996.) decided that it was time to take their profits and run. This selling pressure resulted in the basis on the March Value Line futures collapsing. We had lost all of our profits. My losses for the afternoon exceeded onethird of my annual salary.
In mid-January, I distributed the proceeds to the partners, after depositing a large check made out to The Free Lunch Club into an ATM. We had earned the risk-free rate of interest, but it was not a smooth ride.
I blamed the afternoon's losses on bad luck. The strategy was fundamentally sound. I was an informed trader, trading against uninformed traders. The calendar spread had worked beautifully.
V. A Little Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing
In Holy Smoke!3 I had a multi-million dollar position in a futures contract that the market was pricing using the wrong formula, and now the market was moving towards pricing it using the correct formula that includes the extra term! Instead of (1 + r -div) being +3%, (1 + r -div -/2?{1 average unique risk }) is -2%. So instead of the theoretical basis being +1.78, it should be -1.21. By this time, five days had gone by, and I had already lost $25,000. And the basis had moved only one-third of the way towards its new theoretical value, so I stood to lose another $50,000 if I couldn't unwind my position.
There was only one problem with unwinding our position. The positions that Jeremy Siegel and I had were 100% of the long positions in the March contract. The only party on the other side had obviously figured out the correct formula, and this party wasn't about to let us out at the "market" price. We had discovered what an "illiquid" position meant.
There might be, however, a way to cut the losses. 
VI. Denouement
The rest of the summer, I lost lots of money on the March-December spread as it fell from +1.80 to -1.60, but made up most of it on the September-December spread. In December, I made lots of money when the basis on the March contract was bid up by speculators anticipating the turn-of-the-year effect. But for the year as a whole, 1986 was a bad year. I lost more in the futures market than I made from my academic salary. And I decided that maybe I wasn't an informed trader after all, but instead was one of those traders who think that they are informed, when in reality they are providing the profits to the truly informed investors.
Years later, I found out who was on the other side of the trades in the summer of 1986. It was Goldman Sachs, with Fischer Black advising the traders, that took me to the cleaners as the market moved from one pricing regime to another.
In the first four years of the Value Line futures contract, the market priced the futures using the wrong formula.4 After the summer of 1986, the market priced the Value Line futures using the right formula. The September 1986 issue of the Journal of Finance published an article (Eytan and Harpaz, 1986) giving the correct formula for the pricing of the Value Line futures. In the transition from one pricing regime to the other, I was nearly wiped out.
The calendar spread strategy might still work today, except for one problem. The problem is that in 1986 trading volume and open interest in the Value Line futures started to decline (Thomas, 1996) . It has collapsed to less than 2% of the activity level of the mid-1980s. Partly, this death spiral occurred because as people began to understand that the Value Line index was a geometric index with strange properties, people didn't want to trade a contract that they didn't understand. In early 1988, the Kansas City Board of Trade switched to an arithmetic Value Line index, which doesn't underperform by 1/21 average unique risk ), but by the time they did so, the death spiral had already occurred. In early 1988, the Value Line arithmetic and geometric indices had the same levels. At the end of 1996, the arithmetic index stood at 690, whereas the geometric index stood at 370 after almost nine years of underperformance by 1{ 2average unique risk }. In the summer of 1986, I tried to warn the Kansas City Board of Trade about the problem with their contract, but they refused to pay my asking price for consulting services. That was a shame. I could have used the money to cover my margin calls. 0
